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seems to prevail in Indiana. McCoy v. Mc0ey, 32 Ind. App. 38, 69 N. E.
193 (1903). But the vast amount of authority is to the contrary.
Speyer v. Desjardins, 144 Ill. 641, 32 N. E. 283 (1892); Van Epps v.
Redfield, 68 Conn. 39, 35 At. 809 (1896).
From the foregoing statements it will be seen that the principal
case represents the modern view in Kentucky and also that this view
is with the weight of authority to the extent of a pleading which
clearly shows a case for the application of the Statute of Frauds. It
is not inconsistent with this majority view when it allows the statute
to be raised by demurrer although it does not appear on the face of
the pleading that the contract is written or parol. The settled rule
in Kentucky is that the pleader must allege a written contract or circumstances removing the case from the operation of the Statute of
Frauds. It such were not the rule, undoubtedly Kentucky would follow the majority view that the statute could not be raised by demurrer.
The majority view appears preferable in the light of reason. If
the pleader, who should undoubtedly be in a better position to state
his ease than any other, can do no more than state a contract, which,
on its face, is unenforceable, then such pleading should be demurrable.
ROBERT E. HATTON, JR.
CRIMus-H
IZcE IN DEFENsE OF PROPERT.--While homicide in
self-defense, and homicide in defense of habitation have historically
been considered justifiable, there has been some confusion regarding
homicide in defense of property other than habitation. Just how far
may the owner go in defending his property? Does a mere trespass
justify taking a human life? Are common law felonies and statutory
felonies against property to be considered alike?
A recent Kentucky case, Comnonwealth v. Beverly, 237 Ky. 35, 34
S. W. (2d) 941 (1931), involved the right of a citizen to kill another
apprehended at night in the act of stealing his chickens. The jury
in the lower court did not agree, and the Court of Appeals was asked
to certify the law in the case. The defendant shot without warning
and continued to fire after repeated requests to stop. He had no evidence that the men were armed, but testified that he feared for his
life. The Court of Appeals certified that the defendant was entitled
to an instruction on self-defense carrying the idea that he shot in
good faith on reasonable grounds to apprehend immediate danger to
his life, but that Lhe jury should also be informed that the defendant
could be found guilty of voluntary manslaughter on the theory that
he used more force than reasonably necessary to prevent the taking
of the chickens. While taking chickens valued at more than three
dollars is a statutory felony in Kentucky, the law does not justify the
taking of human life to prevent a felony not involving the security of
the person or home, or in which violence is not a constituent part.

STUDENT NOTES

Kentucky is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions on this
point. State v. Terrill, 55 Utah 314, 186 Pac. 108 (1919); Wallace v.
U. S., 162 U. S. 466, 16 S. Ct. 859 (1896); Ordacre v. State, 196 Ala.
690, 72 So. 303 (1916). One state, Texas, has a statute making killing
justifiable when property is being stolen at night or while the thief is
within gunshot of the scene of theft. Teague v. State. 84 Tex. Cr. R.
169, 206 S. W. 193 (1918).
Even Texas, however, apparently limits this statute to offenses
which are more serious than misdemeanors. See McKinney v. State,
96 Tex. Cr. R. 342, 257 S. W. 258 (1924), which holds that killing a
boy In defendant's melon patch at night, in view of Penal Code 1911,
art. 1234, making the act of taking melons from a farm a misdemeanor only, is not within art. 1105 making killing justifiable if committed to prevent a theft by night. When the aggression against the
property is made in the daytime, every effort must be made to repel
the aggression before killing is justified. Richardson v. State, 91 Tex.
Cr. R. 318, 239 S. W. 218 (1922).
The distinction as to thefts at night is apparently based on the
Idea that apprehension of the thief is much more difficult. Kentucky
and jurisdictions in accord would probably give weight also to the
fact that darkness increases apprehension of personal danger, since
It is impossible to see whether the wrongdoer is armed.
Just how far may one go in defending his property? Kentucky
and concurring jurisdictions seem to hold that one may use any
method short of taking human life or inflicting grave bodily injury.
Stacy v. Com., 189 Ky. 402, 225 S. W. 37 (1920), says that an owner
in possession of either real or personal property has a right to use
such means as in the exercise of reasonable judgment are necessary to
protect his premises from forcible invasion and to prevent the forcible
attempt to divest him of possession of his personal property, and in
defense of his rights, an assault and battery upon the trespasser will
be justified. But in no case is the taking of life or the infliction of
great bodily harm allowable where the invasion is made without actual
force even though forcible in law, and even if a trespass is made with
actual force, the right to take life does not arise until the trespasser
assaults the owner and there are reasonable grounds to believe that
It is necessary to kill or wound to protect life or to prevent great
bodily injury. See also Bozeman v. State, 150 Ga. 667, 104 S. . 640
(1920); State v. McCracken, 122 N. M. 588, 166 P. 1174 (1917); State
v. Holbrook, 98 or 43, 193 Pac. 434 (1920).
Even self-defense will not always avail the defendant as an excuse,
if he killed after inviting the combat himself in cases where the trespass was completed before the altercation arose. Doneghy v. Com.,
208 Ky. 500, 271 S. W. 5S6 (1925).
If all the elements needed to justify killing to defend one's property are present, how long does the right to kill continue? Does it
end as soon as the crime is technically complete, or continue so as to
allow killing during pursuit to stop the wrongdoer and retake the
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property? Missouri holds that the right of the owner to use force is
not confined to the immediate time and place of taking, but continues
though the property is taken temporarily out of his sight if pursuit
is immediate. State v. Dooley, 121 Mo. 591, 26 S. W. 558 (1894). However, killing in retaking property fraudulently or forcibly taken Is not
justified when more force is used than is necessary for the retaking;
the amount of force which may be reasonably used is a question of
fact for the jury under the particular circumstances of the case.
Com. v. Donahue, 148 Mass. 529, 20 N. E. 171 (1889). Kentucky holds
that the right to defend against robber7 remains with the owner as
long as his property is in his immediate presence, and killing of the
robber will prevent its being taken away. Flynn v. Com., 204 Ky. 572,
264 S. W. 1111 (1924). This apparently does not allow killing while
in pursuit of the wrongdoer from the scene of the crime unless personal danger is feared, but does allow homicide after the technical
completion of the crime.
The right to kill in defending one's habitation against intruders
has long been established. This, however, partakes almost entirely of
the right to self-defense and defense of those in one's care rather than
the right to defend one's property. See Wharton's Homicide (3rd. Ed.),
sec. 530.
The right to defend real property other than habitation follows
closely the rules regarding defense of personal property. Bare trespass does not warrant the owner in killing to prevent it. Chapman v.
Com., 12 K. L. R. 704, 15 S. VT. 50 (1891). He can use such force as
is necessary to get the intruder off the premises, but must not use
force with intent to inflict bodily injury. Tiffany v. Com., 121 Pa. 165,
6 Am. St. Rep. 775 (1888); State v. Warren, 1 Mary. (Del.) 4874 41
Atl. 190 (1893). It is a general rule that the use of spring guns is unlawful, and the owner is guilty of murder if death results. State v.
Moore, 31 Conn. 479, 83 Am. Dec. 159 (163). He can, of course, repel
force with force, based upon the idea of self-defense.
To summarize: The right to kill in defense of real and personal property is in the main an extension of the right of self-defense.
In the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, unless his life
is in danger or grave bodily harm is threatened, the owner may only
use methods of defending his prolerty which do not involve danger of
death or grave bodily injury to the wrongdoer. He may repel force
with force, but he uses excessive force at his own peril. The reasonableness of the owner's apprehension of death or grave injury to his
person, and the amount of force that he may reasonably use under the
particular circumstances of the case are questions of fact for the jury.
ELEANOR DAwsoN.
SALEs-LIABILITY OF RESTAURANT OwNE FOR SFnuvING UNIT FOOD.
-In
the case of Friend v. Child's Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120
N. E. 407 (1918), the plaintiff entered the defendant's restaurant and

